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Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of market volatility and increased fiscal take on risk in 
strategic natural resource projects. An increase in 2006 UK oilfield taxation is 
used as a natural experiment for assessing the impact of a fiscal increase on 
oilfield projects comprising 73% of UK reserves. Stochastic cash flow at risk 
models combine market volatility and tax-take at the oilfield level to extend 
earlier North Sea studies. We demonstrate that a 10% Secondary tax increase in 
a composite UKCS fiscal system with a-priori nonlinearity directly increases 
overall cost structures, resulting in a 14% decrease in project values, and 
significantly, a 67% risk increase for UK Oilfields. Risk effects are asymmetrical 
across the size varying sample, marginal prospects are most affected.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Investments in oilfield projects are expanding as executives and financiers enter 
new geographic markets, invest in strategic assets, accommodate alliance 
partners and attempt to immunise corporate entities from new venture risks. 
Global project finance investments reflect this trend, with general annualised 
advance growth of 24% from 2001-2005, building on the annual growth of 20% 
throughout the 1990’s (Esty 2004). In value terms, advances declined briefly in 
the wake of global uncertainty from a high of US$210 billion in 2000 to US$80 
billion in 2002 before recovering to US$347 billion in 2004 and 2005, a recovery 
and growth trend that is set to continue.1 From a low share of global advances in 
2001, the last five years has seen stakeholders use these structures to commit to 
annualised advance growth in the emerging markets of the Middle East (84%), 
Africa (68%) and the Indian Subcontinent (168%).  
 
Esty (2004), provided well-reasoned insights into reasons behind the burgeoning 
growth of project finance that apply equally to the oil and gas sector. He 
categorised project finance according to the stakeholder principle as involving the 
creation of a ‘legally independent project company financed with equity from one 
or more sponsoring firms and non-recourse debt for the purpose of investing in a 
capital asset’.  We use insights into the UKCS E&P sector to demonstrate that 
stakeholder capital structures in natural resource projects are extremely 
vulnerable to variations in fiscal take and market uncertainties. The standalone 
nature of oilfield finance structures and their exposure to single assets are shown 
to be susceptible to specific risks.  We examine the impact of two of these; fiscal 
                                                 
1 Regional Project Finance Activity 2000 – 2005 – Banking League Table, Project Finance Magazine - 
March 2006 
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take (measured by the tax impact on overall project leverage) and market 
uncertainty (characterised in our study by commodity price volatility).2  
 
By treating the 2006 UK continental shelf (UKCS) change in supplementary 
corporate taxation for oilfields (SCT) as a natural experiment, we use stochastic 
models to determine the impact of fiscal terms on overall risk. We find that, while 
field values fell, downside risk increased disproportionately for UKCS project 
stakeholders when in December 2005 Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, changed the government’s take. In his pre-budget statement the 
Chancellor noted: “…the tax on new development in the North Sea (is) now lower 
than in the USA and the Gulf of Mexico, Norway, Italy and Australia, and in order 
to strike the right balance… ...I will raise the supplementary North Sea charge 
from 10% to 20%”. 
 
Prior to the increase in Supplementary Corporation Tax (SCT), the taxation rate 
for new UKCS fields was 40%, made up of Corporation Tax payable at a rate of 
30% and of SCT at 10%.  With no change in the Corporation Tax rate, the pre-
budget statement increase lifted the effective field tax rate from 40% to 50%. We 
analyse this tax change modelling the interaction between market price volatility, 
and tax take before and after the tax announcement. Specifically, the blanket 
10% SCT increase allows us to examine three questions concerning the combined 
impact of market uncertainty and taxation on asset cashflow at risk (CFaR).3  
 
First, we analyse whether the SCT effect is equitable across all UKCS fields by 
focussing on the differential impact of tax (and therefore fiscal take) across the 
                                                 
2 Throughout our analysis we use the term ‘goverment take’ as understood in the oil industry; namely, 
as the percentage of present value of tax paid over field life in all forms of government levied taxes 
after taking account of fixed and operating cost allowances. 
3 We use the term natural experiment as defined in economics, namely the situation where an isolated 
change in one aspect of the economic environment occurs making it possible to study the effects of 
that change as if it were an experiment; that is, by assuming that every other exogenous input 
remains unchanged 
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sample, finding that fields experienced an average reduction in value of 14.65% 
and that this reduction varied widely across the sample due to differences in 
leverage (oilfield size).  
 
Next, we use stochastic CFaR risk measures to analyse the effect taxation on 
operator risks, demonstrating that while value fell by an average 14.65%, field 
risks (as measured by the ability of a field to attain pre tax increase present 
values) increased disproportionately by 67.09%.  
 
Finally, we analyse the impact of taxation on field leverage (measured as: the 
present value of total field revenue/ the present value of fiscal take) on risk, and 
the UK government’s objective of encouraging new UKCS investment. Our results 
provide strong evidence that value reduction and the impact on risk 
characteristics has the most effect on marginal oilfields and hence is likely to run 
counter to the government’s aim of stimulating tertiary developments in the 
North Sea. 
 
We begin by reviewing prior studies of value at risk models and UKCS fiscal terms 
before introducing our data set. We then focus on our stochastic valuation and 
CFaR methodology before concluding by reviewing our results. 
 
2. CFar and Taxation in Oilfield Finance Literature 
 
Esty (2004) in his review of project finance observes that there is a paucity of 
research in this area. We agree with his insight that project finance studies 
provide rich scope to study market volatility and risk.4 To cover the latter two 
attributes, we draw on both corporate finance studies assessing risk measures 
– 7 – 
and on economic literature, covering the desirable characteristics of taxation 
models in oilfield investment decision making. 
 
Research on appropriate measures of market risk for non-financial firms have 
recently focused on extending the value-at-risk (VaR) method initially developed 
for financial institutions into general corporate use (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 
1993, Stulz 1996, and Stein et al, 2001). Applied studies of VaR suggest it (and 
by extension CFaR) can be estimated from modelling the uncertainty of a firm’s 
future cashflows and consequently can be used to compute the total variability of 
value to market and project-specific risks. In an approach close to that adopted in 
this paper, Jobst, Mitra and Zenios (2005) extend VaR into a multiperiod analysis, 
a measure of risk more appropriate for untraded and illiquid assets held over long 
periods of time. Andren, Jankensgard and Oxenheim (2005) propose a measure 
for estimating the amount ‘at risk’ using a cashflow-at-risk (CFaR) approach that, 
like ours, estimates the maximum shortfall in cash at a given confidence level 
(within dynamic models). 
 
Lund (2003) makes the point, in the context of the cash flow modelling problem, 
that taxes have imperfect loss offset; noting that if an oilfield’s tax base is 
negative one year, there is no immediate refund to offset taxable losses, but only 
the ability to set current losses against future profits. He expands the point that 
imperfect loss offset tax claims are analogous to (fiscal) call options on future 
cashflows. 5 Lund (2006), also observes in a later work that the economic theory 
of neutral business taxation under uncertainty is fairly well developed, but that 
there are several obstacles to its practical application in the petroleum sector. Not 
least of which is the existence of composite tax charges, the UKCS for instance 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Esty (2004) traces the history of project finance from the 1299 financing of a Devon silver mine 
through the 1930 wildcat financing of oilfields. He finds that modern project finance has its roots in 
the natural resource and the independent power producers financing of the late 1970s and 1980s. 
5 Under UK tax rules losses in one fiscal period for UKCS fields may be carried forward but there are 
limitations to this and the present value is not maintained 
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has PRT, corporate taxation, SCT and royalty taxation. Early oilfield studies of risk 
avoided this difficulty and often dealt with taxation as a constant function ratio 
(that is, 1 – tax rate) with little regard to field-specific tax conditions, dynamic 
operating conditions and commodity prices.  
 
In North Sea studies, Favero, Pesaran and Sharma (1992a) for instance 
emphasized that the prerequisite to omit tax from an econometric model was tax 
neutrality, a condition that does not hold for the UKCS. They gave two reasons 
for the non-neutrality of pre-1992 UKCS tax terms: (1) the lack of 
progressiveness (PRT is ad hoc, not progressive) and (2) the ring fencing of 
losses on exploration from other field profits; early insights that provide a clear 
indication of the asymmetrical effects of UKCS fiscal terms. In a later study, 
Favero, Pesaran and Sharma (1994) extended their earlier paper and considered 
the consequences of irreversibility of capital expenditure and valuation difficulties 
involved in the investment decision by examining the valuation of a single North 
Sea oilfield. In an in depth study, Bradley (1998) notes that when policy makers 
consider a new fiscal system (like SCT) a primary concern is to maintain royalty 
and tax receipts rather than project investment.  
 
In a study that examined the tax effects for North Sea oilfields, Hahn and 
Rowland (1986) criticized the uneven effect of PRT which led to ad hoc tax 
treatment for some less profitable fields. In another analysis of PRT and UKCS tax 
related changes, Jacoby and Laughton (1992) noted that the nonlinearities and 
asymmetry in the then prevailing UK offshore fiscal regime moved risk from the 
operators onto the government. A more recent study by Zhang (1997) provided a 
contra perspective on the impact of PRT, where he argued that PRT, by uplifting 
the tax rate on revenues after the upfront development allowances are depleted, 
could lead to a neutral tax effect. Like Lund (2003), Neimann and Sureth (2002) 
emphasise the materiality of taxation in valuation models. They consider that the 
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correct treatment of tax in dynamic models is a critical element in determining 
capital budgeting but find that tax specificity and asymmetry prevent dynamic 
models reaching universal formulaic solutions. 
 
A solution designed to correctly account for tax terms and price uncertainty in 
stochastic CFaR measures is proposed by Kretzschmar, Moles and Charalambos, 
(2005), they use an approach where each pre-tax simulation is passed through a 
detailed tax adjustment to cash flows ‘inside the field model’ using composite 
calculations for UKCS government take, that is, PRT, SCT and Corporate Tax 
terms – for each simulation of after tax cash flow. This approach correctly 
specifies the tax effect at the field level and the computation of CFaR for all 
iterations by calculating the field tax applicable to each price assumption.  
 
3. Valuation and Sample Field Characteristics 
 
The O&G industry, and in particular producing fields, provides a useful testing 
ground for assessing project risks. Projects are based on definable assets which 
require predictable initial and ongoing capital investments. Assets also have a 
specific life during which the resource is exploited and ultimately abandoned with 
a largely homogenous and actively traded O&G output. Finally global oilfield tax 
terms, or at least elements of them, are often clearly aligned with the field as 
opposed to the corporate entity, an important feature of our UKCS natural 
experiment. Ironically it is this very homogeneity that makes it possible for the 
government to target the O&G sector with specific taxation measures without 
affecting other corporate taxpayers. 
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Sample selection was determined by eliminating all UKCS fields below 6 million 
barrels of oil equivalent (mmboe) remaining.6 Thereafter the remaining O&G 
reserves as at January 2006 were ranked according to descending reserve size. 
In order not to bias the sample remaining fields were ranked, split into quartiles 
with 10 fields randomly selected from each quartile to obtain an additional sample 
of 40 smaller fields. In analysing the total sample of 70, one small field was 
rejected on the basis of having extraordinarily high levels of abandonment 
expenditure, leaving 69 in the final analysis. 
 
Summary statistics for the field valuations are given in Table 1 and show that the 
average life of a field in our sample is 21 years and represents 66.55% of total 
UKCS O&G remaining reserves, 73.16% of oil reserves and 59.07% of gas 
reserves. The extent of our sample allows us to analyze the size varying effects of 
government take for ‘in production’ oilfields and to reach general conclusions not 
possible from single field studies. We also use stochastic modeling to identify the 
risk characteristics for our sample. Our analysis is simplified by the fact that there 
is little technical and exploration risk for producing oilfields.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
A comparison of initial and remaining reserves in columns 5 and 8 of Table 1 
indicates that with less than a quarter of reserves remaining, most fields have 
been in-production for a number of years. The UKCS petroleum province saw oil 
production peak at 934 million barrels in 1999 and since then has declined at 
around 6% per annum (Department of Trade and Industry). Our Quartile 1 fields 
have on average 36 mmboe of oil and 84 mmboe O&G remaining and are less 
than 2% the size of Top 30 fields. In this context, the UK Offshore Operators 
                                                 
6 Fields below 6mmboe are not sampled as they display very high degrees of specificity and are 
generally close to abandonment 
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Association (UKOOA) notes that the average size of discoveries in the UKCS 
between 1995 and 2004 was 26 mmboe, comparable to about one-tenth of the 
size of average discoveries in the first ten years of the sector's life, putting new 
finds firmly into the risky Quartile 1. 
 
4. Method 
 
We use detailed oilfield data to empirically model the effect of the increase in SCT 
on after-tax value distributions and risk profiles and how these relate to 
operational and fiscal specificities. Detailed field cashflow models incorporating oil 
and gas price volatility are used in a two-step process to highlight tax effects on 
present values. First, for all 69 fields, as at January 2006 pre-tax estimates of 
cashflows are derived followed by post-tax field values prior to and after the 
proposed 2006 increase in SCT. Second, we create dynamic models to estimate 
CFaR by adding price volatility to the underlying deterministic present value 
model, deriving whole life expected present value (PV) distributions. By treating 
each oilfield as a separate project we are able to avoid making assumptions about 
tax efficiency or the composition of the corporate portfolio. Guided by Esty (2004) 
we assume standalone equity structures and non-recourse debt to focus on fiscal 
and operational leverage.  
 
Our estimates of CFaR are derived using a bottom-up approach in line with that 
proposed by RiskMetrics (1999) where the stochastic behaviour of production 
volumes, revenues, field operating and capital costs are used to derive a 
probability and frequency distribution of oilfield expected value over the lifetime 
of the field (both before and after the 2006 tax term change). In simulating the 
effect of government tax on field risk under conditions of oil price volatility we 
incorporate Bessembinder et al (1995) - prices commence in 2006 at US$52.50 
per barrel and ‘mean revert’ over 4 years to $37.50 before increasing by an 
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assumed rate of inflation of 2.5%. Each annual price is subject to a lognormal 
volatility distribution of 25%.7 We run 2500 simulations for each of the 70 fields 
under each condition and use the results to derive a cashflow distribution for field 
value and CFaR, which by extension becomes a key feature of our analysis. 
 
The simulation output is shown in Figure 1 with the results for one field 
simulation pre- and post-tax in Figure 1a and 1b with Figure 1c showing the 
difference between the post-tax likelihood of achieving the base case after the 
SCT change. The downside CFaR tails for both the pre- and post-tax change 
distributions were calculated using the pre-simulation base case value in our field 
model; for the field in Figure 1 deterministic PV values were US$2696.15 million 
pre-tax with post-tax US$961.17 million before the budget change and 
US$817.36m afterwards (a decline of 15%).  
 
[Insert Figure 1a, 1b and 1c about here] 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the pre- and post-tax certainty distribution for a field that is 
not subject to PRT. It is apparent that for non-PRT fields, before the tax change, 
the certainty of achieving the deterministic field value is approximately the same 
pre- and post-tax with certainty levels of 86.89% and 85.62% respectively. As 
will be discussed in the results section, for fields subject to PRT there is not the 
same equivalence between pre- and post-tax certainty. For the above field, the 
10% increase in the SCT changes the CFaR in the field so that the probability of 
achieving the after-tax but pre-SCT increase value of US$961.17 million falls from 
85.62% to 21.82%.  
 
5. Results 
                                                 
7 Note we tested oilfields under different price scenarios, including down shocks, and the principle 
findings do not critically depend on these modelling assumptions. Our scenarios imply a generally 
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The above preliminary findings indicate that for operators and financiers the field 
value and risk profile have been dramatically altered by the tax change. A 
summary of the descriptive statistics for all field simulations (by quartile) is 
contained in Appendix 1. Our results are summarised in two stages: first, the tax 
effects of operational and fiscal leverage on field values are presented and 
analysed. We then present and examine fiscal effects on field risk.  
 
5.1 Operational and Fiscal Leverage Risk effects 
 
Table 2 summarises for the sample the PV for pre-tax revenue, operating costs 
and capital expenditure and net cashflow by quartile, both in value terms and as 
a percentage of gross revenue. The analysis shows that, given indivisibilities in rig 
and pipeline investments and to a lesser extent operating expenditures, Quartile 
1 which consists of the smallest fields, has an average pre-tax PV of US$104.57 
million and the highest operational and capital expenditure leverage at 1.36 and 
1.51 respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In comparison the Top 30 have an average PV of US$2565.11 million (column 4) 
and operational and capital expenditure leverage ratios of 1.09 and 1.24. On 
these measures, Quartile 1 fields are less than 5% the value and 27% more 
operationally leveraged than the Top 30 group. That said, Quartiles 2 to 4 have 
similar operational leverage characteristics and show evidence of declining capital 
expenditure leverage in line with field maturity profiles. Although indicative of a 
mature and developed regime this suggests fields greater in size than the 
average smallest field (that is with a PV of pre-tax cashflows around US$400 
                                                                                                                                            
favourable outlook for the oil price 
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million) do not suffer from the indivisibility of capital expenditures and have 
operational advantages of scale, with leverage characteristics more in common 
with the largest fields. 
 
Table 3 considers the effect of government take on field outputs. As discussed 
earlier, part of the tax asymmetry effect is caused by older fields subject to 
legacy PRT, which was unaffected by the tax increase and the average amounts 
of this prior tax for each group is shown in column 2. Using the tax terms 
prevailing prior to the December 2005 increase in SCT, columns 2 and 3 give the 
present value of the government take. Column 4 calculates the pre-budget PV of 
post-tax cashflows which can be taken to be an estimate of the commercial field 
values under the modelling assumptions. The effective tax take (namely, the ratio 
of all forms of tax to pre-tax cashflow) for the sample is 49.13% and shows the 
average impact of UKCS tax terms. There are differences across the sample with 
a tax take for small fields of 34.46% compared to larger fields which pay, 
depending on the extent to which they are subject to PRT or not, between 
40.74% and 50.79%. It should be noted that the low Quartile 1 tax take needs to 
be read together with high operating leverage for this group. Even though tax 
take is lower, it is from a lower base given that gearing levels of 1.36 and 1.51 
ensure that more pre-tax cashflow is spent on managing the field. Hence the tax 
take is based on a narrower residual cashflow stream, making these fields more 
sensitive to government take rates. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.2 The Fiscal Leverage Impact 
 
We now consider the effect of the increase in SCT and recalculate the tax take at 
the now higher rate. For non-PRT fields, the total tax rate rises by 10%, from 
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40% to 50%, for PRT fields, the combined effect is to raise tax from 70% to 75%. 
For the whole sample the total average tax take rises from $653.13 million to 
$748.80 million, that is, an increase of 14.65%, as shown in column 9. So while 
the average tax take pre-budget was 49.13% and rises to 56.32%, fiscal 
leverage raises the government take by much more than the announced tax 
increase, a finding in line with Salahor (1998). Paradoxically, as the Top 30 group 
show, as suggested by Zhang (1997), PRT acts to mitigate this leverage since the 
increase in tax take for this group at 13.77% is the smallest and accords with the 
Favero, Pesaran and Sharma (1992b) view about the ad hoc effect of PRT on field 
value. At the other extreme Quartile 1 fields with marginal economics due to high 
operating and capital costs relative to revenues are the worst affected with an 
20.31% increase in the tax take. Hence these fields have suffered 
disproportionately from the increase in SCT with adverse effects on their risk 
characteristics. Size and leverage effects will be shown to be important factors in 
interpreting the stochastic analysis. 
 
The above analysis suggests that operational and capital leverage combine to 
create significant value shifts from fiscal changes due to complex multiplier and 
interaction effects between field specificities and the way that the tax system 
operates. The after-tax field value and CFaR clearly depends on the effective tax 
rate that is applicable. What is evident is that the 10% increase in tax has 
affected the economics of fields in very different ways depending on their size, 
future life, and their operational and capital leverage characteristics.  
 
Full life field value is calculated in Table 4 by combining the earlier valuation 
analysis in Table 2 with the tax effects from Table 3. Across the sample, the PV of 
pre-tax cashflows (column 1) averaged US$1,329.53 million. Prior to the change 
in SCT, the average PV of post-tax cashflows was US$676.39 million, 
representing 50.87% of pre-tax cashflow. Following the tax increase the average 
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post-tax cashflow is now US$580.87 million, or 43.68% of pre-tax cashflow. Due 
to fiscal leverage, fields have lost 14.14% of after-tax cashflow from the 10% tax 
increase. As with the government take discussed earlier, the effect is not uniform 
across the different sub-groups. The effect of the tax increase is most marked for 
larger fields where values are reduced by 14.99% (for the Top 30 this is 14.22% 
due to the PRT effect and starting from a higher tax rate). The smallest Quartile 1 
fields experience a 10.68% drop in after-tax value.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Note the difficulty of assessing the impact of tax take in isolation of field 
characteristics, most notably its operational leverage, is to understate the amount 
of additional tax taken from free cashflow. A particular feature of investment in 
these assets is that operational costs and future capital expenditure have to be 
financed by the field owner since government take only offers capital allowances 
and deferred tax credits for operating losses. The effect of this asymmetry is that 
it falls to the field operator to meet fiscal cashflows after meeting operating and 
capital expenditure. 
 
5.3 CFaR Measures 
The previous section considered how fiscal leverage affects the post-tax value of 
the fields in our sample and how operating and capital spend interacts with 
taxation to affect the lower bound tail values for fields. A key issue is the effect of 
these factors on the distribution of after-tax value when we consider future 
uncertainty. In this section, we compare estimates of field risk, namely CFaR that 
we derive from our stochastic analysis, noting variations caused by field 
characteristics and operational risks.  
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In Table 5, we use the results of our stochastic analysis to compute the CFaR 
certainty of achieving the PV of after-tax cashflow value pre-budget and the same 
value post-budget. As discussed earlier, for the sample as a whole, the ratio of 
pre-tax to post-tax cashflow falls from 50.87% to 43.68% (Table 5); a reduction 
in after-tax value of 14.14% (Table 5 columns 1 to 3). Before the tax change, 
using our modelling assumptions, the probability of achieving the after-tax value 
with an uncertain future oil price is 81.83% for the whole sample. There are 
minor variations for the sub-groups where, for instance, Quartile 2 has the lowest 
probability with 77.72% and Quartile 3 the highest with 84.61%.  
 
After the tax increase, the probability of achieving the same after-tax value is 
shown in column 5 and drops to 26.93% for the sample as a whole, a fall of 
67.09%.8 That is, a 10% change in tax rates has led to a drop of two thirds in the 
likelihood of achieving the pre-tax set of after-tax cashflows. As with our earlier 
analysis, this effect is not uniform across the sample. The worst affected group is 
Quartile 4 with a 69.92% change and the least affected group is Quartile 1 with a 
45.46% drop. There is a clear multiplier link between the reduction in after-tax 
cashflows shown in column 3 and the resultant loss of certainty shown in column 
6, an interesting result and one that provides rich scope for further research. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The fall in cashflow which varies between 10.68% (Quartile 1) and 14.99% 
(Quartile 4) in turn gives rise to an increase in downside uncertainty of 45.46% 
and 69.92% respectively. This relationship suggests that oilfield value certainties 
are extremely sensitive to changes in after-tax cashflows. An examination of the 
Top 30 shows this is due to fiscal leverage and the level of tax take. For this 
                                                 
8 We recognize that there are a number of ways of estimating field risk that will lead to different 
values, but which will lead to the same conclusion: that the tax increase raises risk. To simplify the 
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group, while fall in cashflow is 14.22%, slightly less than that for Quartile 4, but 
the loss in certainty is higher at 74.03%. Recall from Table 2 that this Top 30 
group has the least operational and capital expenditure leverage, so the loss of 
certainty is being generated by the tax change (which for most of this group is 
only 5% due to PRT). This is in line with Bradley (1998) who notes that tax 
effects depend on the degree of sensitivity of fields to relatively small changes in 
after-tax cashflow. Using CFaR in this way, clearly allows us to see the 
consequence of the fiscal leverage effect on oilfield values and risk. 
 
When these results are read together with Esty’s (2004) observation that financial 
leverage in project finance averages 70%, our CFaR analysis clearly highlights the 
combined effects of tax leverage and market volatility on the certainty of payback 
for debt providers. The average downside increase of 67.07% clearly increases 
the risk of default as a result of tax take directly impacting residual cashflows 
available to project financiers. Our results indicate the large impact of fiscal 
leverage on the risk of investment in UKCS O&G fields where small changes in tax 
rates have a multiplier and knock-on effect on field values.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Our findings are relevant in three significant respects. First, blanket taxation 
increases in an a priori asymmetrical fiscal regime, impacts total leverage and 
risk unevenly across projects, significantly reducing the incentive to operate 
marginal projects. In our study, Quartile 1, with small reserves relative to 
required capital investment and operational costs has the highest operating 
leverage and capital expenditure and the greatest sensitivity to fiscal leverage. As 
a consequence, our results show that under these conditions the increase in fiscal 
                                                                                                                                            
analysis and in recognition of the downside effect of the tax increase, we use the probability of 
obtaining the pre-tax change value as our benchmark 
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take will not deliver to the UKOOA objective which identified marginal field 
development as strategically important to UKCS shelf productivity.  
 
Second, our CFaR results suggest that, from an investment perspective, higher 
confidence levels are achievable for projects with low operational and fiscal 
leverage, and that these are to be favoured. Across our sample, an average 
reduction in value of 14% resulted in leveraged changes in certainty levels of 
67% making it likely that financiers will react to these increased risk measures in 
the time honoured banking manner, by reducing the amount of committed UKCS 
risk capital and lowering the amount of debt finance available to projects (or at 
minimum hedging against downside risks). Our findings are in line with Bradley 
(1998) who showed that fiscal systems are capable of impacting certainty in 
cashflows. Differences between quartiles and fields occur because of direct 
market risk effects acting on projects with differing operating and fiscal leverage. 
 
Finally, in a homogenous investment setting, when tax terms increase and are 
combined with market uncertainty, disposable cashflow is impacted and new 
projects are the first to suffer financier and executive scrutiny. The irreversible 
nature of oilfield rig and capital investment in our study ensures that while 
existing operator decisions are unlikely to be reversed, potential new project 
entrants will view the UKCS differently and marginal Quartile 1 developments in 
particular will be delayed or abandoned. With imperfect loss offset and call 
options on future cashflows in the hands of the Chancellor, changes in fiscal 
terms are incapable of being hedged. Certainty losses of 67% read together with 
financing leverage of 70% that is the norm in project finance, suggest that the 
new tax terms are likely to directly impact the UKOOA objective of encouraging 
US$15Bn worth of new UKCS investment.  
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In summary, following a natural experiment, our research examined one type of 
natural resource asset in one jurisdiction under conditions of commodity price 
uncertainty. While our findings are specific to UKCS offshore projects, we believe 
that the CFaR approach to modelling the risk effects of fiscal take in industrial 
settings with commodity price risk has a general applicability to project finance 
and hedging arrangements underlying strategic assets. This holds particularly in 
industries such as natural resources where composite tax terms attach to assets 
or projects and are (themselves) capable of causing asymmetries between 
investment-alternatives.
– 21 – 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for fields 
Gas is converted to a barrel of oil equivalent measure using the industry standard 
conversion ratio of 1 billion cubic feet of gas (bcf) = 0.176 million barrels of 
oil equivalent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Estimated present values for revenues, operating costs and 
capital expenditure 
All future cashflows have been present valued using a 10% discount rate 
 
Total Remaining Initial Initial Initial Oil Remaining Remaining Remaining Oil
AVERAGE field life field life Liquids Gas Equivalent Liquids Gas Equivalent
years years (mmbbl) (bcf) (mmboe) (mmbbl) (bcf) (mmboe)
UKCS TOTAL 27882 96498 44863 5395 27151 10172
TOTAL SAMPLE 21 12 16409 37269 22966 3947 16039 6769
QUARTILE 1 15 9 153 770 289 36 274 84
QUARTILE 2 15 7 353 1615 636 103 387 171
QUARTILE 3 13 9 420 1056 604 158 701 280
QUARTILE 4 17 13 407 1831 729 238 1381 483
TOP 30 28 15 15076 31997 20708 3412 13296 5751
SAMPLE AS % 
of TOTAL UKCS 
RESERVES
58.85% 38.62% 51.19% 73.16% 59.07% 66.55%
 PV PV PV PV
Gross Operating Capital Pretax
AVERAGE Revenue Costs Costs Cash Flows
Operational 
leverage 
Ratio
Capex 
leverage 
Ratio
$M $M $M $M
TOTAL SAMPLE 1,802.34  339.81    133.01  1,329.53    1.10          1.26          
QUARTILE 1 194.89     52.87      37.45    104.57       1.36          1.51          
QUARTILE 2 361.54     81.49      31.00    249.05       1.12          1.33          
QUARTILE 3 609.62     132.92    53.21    423.49       1.13          1.31          
QUARTILE 4 1,107.36  234.70    93.49    779.18       1.12          1.30          
TOP 30 3,424.50  622.05    237.33  2,565.11    1.09          1.24          
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Table 3: Effect of 10% increase in the Supplementary Corporation Tax on 
government take 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Oilfield valuation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Cashflow at Risk Estimates 
PV PV PV PV PV PV Pre Budget -
Pretax Pre Budget Post Budget Pre Budget Post Budget Pre Budget Post Budget Post Budget
AVERAGE Cash Flows PRT
Corporate 
Tax
Corporate 
Tax
Post Tax 
Cash Flows
Post Tax 
Cash Flows
Post Tax    Cash 
Flows / Pre Tax 
Cash Fows
Post Tax    Cash 
Flows / Pre Tax 
Cash Fows
change in 
Post Tax Cash 
Flows
$M $M $M $M $M $M % % %
TOTAL SAMPLE 1,329.53    198.72  454.41        550.08        676.39       580.72        50.87% 43.68% -14.14%
QUARTILE 1 104.57       -       36.04          43.35          68.54         61.22          65.54% 58.54% -10.68%
QUARTILE 2 249.05       5.17      105.51        122.72        138.37       121.17        55.56% 48.65% -12.44%
QUARTILE 3 423.49       -       165.89        200.81        257.61       222.68        60.83% 52.58% -13.56%
QUARTILE 4 779.18       1.44      315.98        385.19        461.76      392.55        59.26% 50.38% -14.99%
TOP 30 2,565.11    454.91  847.88        1,027.32     1,262.32    1,082.88     49.21% 42.22% -14.22%
Pre Budget - Pre Budget Post Budget Change in
Pre Budget Post Budget Post Budget Certainty of Certainty of Certainty of
AVERAGE
Post Tax    Cash 
Flows / Pre Tax 
Cash Flow
Post Tax    Cash 
Flows / Pre Tax 
Cash Flow
Change in Post 
Tax Cash Flows
Pre-Budget 
Post Tax Cash 
Flows
Pre-Budget 
Post Tax Cash 
Flows
Pre-Budget 
Post Tax Cash 
Flows
% % % % % %
TOTAL SAMPLE 50.87% 43.68% -14.14% 81.83% 26.93% -67.09%
QUARTILE 1 65.54% 58.54% -10.68% 80.09% 43.68% -45.46%
QUARTILE 2 55.56% 48.65% -12.44% 77.72% 25.40% -67.31%
QUARTILE 3 60.83% 52.58% -13.56% 84.61% 29.93% -64.63%
QUARTILE 4 59.26% 50.38% -14.99% 84.22% 25.33% -69.92%
TOP 30 49.21% 42.22% -14.22% 82.13% 21.33% -74.03%
PV PV PV PV PV PV Pre Budget -
Pretax Pre Budget Post Budget Pre Budget Post Budget Pre Budget Post Budget Post Budget
AVERAGE Cash Flows PRT
Corporate 
Tax
Corporate 
Tax
Total Tax 
Take
Total Tax 
Take
 Tax Cash 
Flows / Pre 
Tax Cash 
Fows
 Tax Cash 
Flows / Pre 
Tax Cash 
Fows
Change in 
Tax Cash 
Flows
$M $M $M $M $M $M % % %
TOTAL SAMPLE 1,329.53    198.72  454.41        550.08        653.14       748.80        49.13% 56.32% -14.65%
QUARTILE 1 104.57       -       36.04          43.35          36.04         43.35          34.46% 41.46% -20.31%
QUARTILE 2 249.05       5.17      105.51        122.72        110.68       127.89        44.44% 51.35% -15.55%
QUARTILE 3 423.49       -       165.89        200.81        165.89       200.81        39.17% 47.42% -21.05%
QUARTILE 4 779.18       1.44      315.98        385.19        317.42       386.63        40.74% 49.62% -21.81%
TOP 30 2,565.11    454.91  847.88        1,027.32     1,302.79    1,482.24     50.79% 57.78% -13.77%
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Appendix 1 Summary of Stochastic Simulation Descriptive Statistics 
Pre Budget Post Budget Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic Mean Percentage
Certainty of Certainty of Mean PV Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Std Error Std Error
AVERAGE
Pre-Budget Post 
Tax Cash Flows
Pre-Budget Post 
Tax Cash Flows
% % $M $M $M $M $M %
TOTAL SAMPLE 81.83% 26.93% 631.18     48.23        0.40          3.29         0.96            0.15%
QUARTILE 1 80.09% 43.68% 70.23       10.13        0.47          3.35         0.20            0.29%
QUARTILE 2 77.72% 25.40% 128.84     14.74        0.42          3.35         0.29            0.23%
QUARTILE 3 84.61% 29.93% 245.52     23.80        0.47          3.38         0.48            0.19%
QUARTILE 4 84.22% 25.33% 438.44     34.56        0.38          3.17         0.69            0.16%
TOP 30 82.13% 21.33% 1,171.99  84.35        0.36          3.25         1.69            0.14%
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 Fig.1. Cashflow value at risk distribution of an oilfield with a pre-
tax net present value of US$ 2696.15 and a simulated probability of 
86.89% of achieving this value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1a Pre tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1b: Post Tax -Pre 2006 Budget Terms   1 c Post Tax - 2006 Budget Terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pre-tax Post-tax old 
terms
Post-tax new 
terms
(Figure 1a) (Figure 1b) (Figure 1c)
Certainty level 86.89% 85.62% 21.82%
Certainty range $2696.15m → ∞ $961.87m → ∞ $961.87m → ∞
Valuation range $2224.81m — 
$3908.12m
$763.32m — 
$1456.03m
$648.73m 
—$1236.54m
Base case valuation $2696.15m $961.87m $817.36m
Std error of mean after
(2500 trials)
Mean $2944.41m $1060.72m $900.93m
4.66 
(0.001583%)
1.96 
(0.00217%)
1.66 
(0.00184%)
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